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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_________________ 
 
No. 16-4355 
_________________ 
 
BRRAM, INC.; HOLLY BUSSEY; WILLIAM G. LYNCH; RICHARD J. DELELLO, 
Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION 
  Respondent 
 
ALLEGIANT AIR LLC,* 
  Intervenor 
 
(* Pursuant to the Court’s Order dated 1/20/17) 
_________________ 
 
On Application for Review of a Decision and Order of the  
Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA No. C070 AMDT 165 Cert WX0A151) 
_________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 15, 2017 
 
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE, FUENTES, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Filed: January 9, 2018 ) 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION** 
_________________ 
                                                 
** This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 BRRAM, Inc., Holly Bussey, William G. Lynch, and Richard Delello (collectively 
“Petitioners”) appeal a Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) decision to allow 
Allegiant Air LLC (“Allegiant”) to operate at Trenton-Mercer Airport (“Trenton”).  For 
the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I.        
 Although the parties in this case have previously been involved in numerous 
appeals regarding Trenton,1 we need only discuss the facts relevant to the case before us.  
Trenton is a commercial airport owned by the Mercer County Board of Chosen 
Freeholders in Ewing Township, New Jersey.  In 2016, Allegiant requested that the FAA 
amend its Operating Specifications2 to allow it to operate at Trenton.  In its request, 
Allegiant explained that it would conduct fourteen operations (seven takeoffs and seven 
landings) at Trenton per week.  Allegiant also submitted an assessment of the noise 
impact its proposed operations would have on the area surrounding Trenton.  The 
assessment stated that Allegiant’s operations at Trenton would not have a significant 
impact on noise levels in the area.  On November 2, 2016, the FAA issued a Record of 
Decision (“Decision”) approving Allegiant’s requested amendment.  The Decision 
discussed Allegiant’s noise assessment along with a noise assessment prepared by 
                                                 
1 See Bd. of Supervisors of Lower Makefield Township v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 3d Cir. 06-
2929; BRRAM v. FAA, 670 Fed. Appx. 50 (3d Cir. 2016).  
2 According to the FAA, an airline’s Operating Specifications are “the terms an air carrier 
must comply with to ensure an air carrier operates safely in air transportation.”  Joint 
Appendix (“J.A.”) 35. 
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Trenton, which was based on a forecast of air traffic twenty years into the future, and 
concluded that “no significant noise impacts will occur as a result of Allegiant’s 
operations.”3  The Petitioners—most of whom reside or operate in Pennsylvania across 
the Delaware River from Trenton—appealed.4  
II.   
 Under the National Environmental Policy Act, federal agencies, including the FAA, 
are required to prepare Environmental Impact Statements for “major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”5  However, an agency need 
not prepare an Environmental Impact Statement if its action falls within one of its 
categorical exclusions, which are defined as “categor[ies] of actions which do not 
individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment and which 
have been found to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency.”6  An 
agency’s list of categorical exclusions must be published in the Federal Register,7 and an 
agency’s procedures must “provide for extraordinary circumstances in which a normally 
excluded action may have a significant environmental effect.”8  Before an agency can 
                                                 
3 J.A. 35. 
4 We have jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a).  We review agency actions using an 
“arbitrary and capricious” standard.  Del. Dep’t of Nat. Resources & Envtl. Control v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 685 F.3d 259, 271 (3d Cir. 2012).  
5 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). 
6 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4. 
7 40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(a). 
8 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4.  
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conclude that its action is categorically excluded, the agency must consider whether any of 
its delineated extraordinary circumstances apply.9  
 The FAA has published a list of categorical exclusions and has also created a list of 
twelve extraordinary circumstances that require more thorough environmental review.10  In 
this case, the FAA considered Allegiant’s request to amend its Operating Specifications 
and determined that no extraordinary circumstances existed.  The FAA then concluded that 
its categorical exclusion for “[o]perating specifications and amendments that do not 
significantly change the operating environment of the airport” applied and that therefore 
preparing an Environmental Impact Statement was unnecessary.11  
The Petitioners challenge the FAA’s determination that Allegiant’s request did not 
present any extraordinary circumstances.  Specifically, the Petitioners take issue with the 
FAA’s conclusion that its extraordinary circumstance regarding noise—which precludes a 
determination that a categorical exclusion is applicable when an action “has the potential 
for a significant impact” on “noise levels of noise sensitive areas”—did not apply to 
Allegiant’s request.12  The Petitioners contend that the FAA acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously because it only evaluated the impact that Allegiant’s fourteen proposed 
operations would have on noise in the area surrounding Trenton.  Instead, the Petitioners 
assert, the FAA was required to consider the impact of Allegiant’s expansion beyond the 
fourteen operations it proposed because the FAA has explained that once an airline is 
                                                 
9 FAA Order 1050.1F at ¶¶ 5-6.2. 
10 Id. at ¶¶ 5-2, 5-6. 
11 FAA Order 1050.1F at ¶ 5-6.2(d). 
12 FAA Order 1050.1F at ¶ 5-2(b). 
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permitted to operate at an airport, the FAA cannot control the number of flights the airline 
will operate.13 
 The Petitioners’ assertions that the FAA only considered Allegiant’s fourteen 
proposed operations in conducting its noise analysis are incorrect.  In fact, as the FAA 
explained in its Decision, the FAA considered both Allegiant’s noise analysis, which only 
accounted for the fourteen proposed operations, and a noise analysis prepared by Trenton 
that was based on a forecast twenty years into the future of all foreseeable air traffic by 
Allegiant and other airlines operating at Trenton.  Neither noise analysis showed that 
Allegiant’s operation at Trenton would have a significant impact on noise in the area under 
the FAA’s prevailing standards for significance. 
 The Petitioners do not challenge the validity of Trenton’s noise analysis.  For 
example, they do not argue that the analysis is based on improper assumptions about future 
air traffic or that its conclusions are erroneous.14  Accordingly, we conclude that the FAA 
                                                 
13 The Township of Lower Makefield (“Township”) submitted an amicus brief in support 
of the Petitioners’ position in this matter.  The Township seconds the Petitioners’ 
arguments regarding the FAA’s noise analysis.   
14 Although the Petitioners do not challenge the methodology behind the noise analyses the 
FAA cited in its Decision, the Township argues that the FAA acted arbitrarily and 
capriciously by relying on Allegiant’s noise analysis because the methodology it used was 
not the model required by FAA Order 1050.1F Appendix B § B-1.2 for a “detailed noise 
analysis.”  The Township’s argument does not hold water.  While FAA Order 1050.1F 
Appendix B § B-1.2 does require that specific methodologies be used for a “detailed noise 
analysis,” FAA Order 1050.1F Appendix B § B-1.1 explains that “[a]ircraft noise screening 
may rule out the need for more detailed noise analysis.”  Here, Allegiant’s analysis 
functioned as a noise screening, and its results indicated that a more detailed noise analysis 
was unnecessary.  Furthermore, Allegiant’s analysis used a methodology (the Area 
Equivalent Method) approved for noise screening by FAA 1050.1F Desk Reference § 
11.1.3. See FAA 1050.1F Desk Reference § 11.1.3, available at 
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did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that its extraordinary circumstance 
regarding noise was not applicable to Allegiant’s request to amend its Operating 
Specifications.  
 Thus, because the Petitioners have waived the rest of their arguments concerning 
the FAA’s Decision in this case,15 we will affirm the FAA’s Decision. 
III.  
  For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the FAA’s Decision to approve Allegiant’s 
requested amendment to its Operating Specifications.  
                                                 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/apl/environ_policy_guidance/
policy/faa_nepa_order/desk_ref/media/11-noise.pdf.  
15 The Petitioners make some additional arguments challenging the FAA’s determinations.  
First, they argue in their Reply brief that the FAA should have provided public notice of 
Allegiant’s proposed amendment and that the situation at issue presents an extraordinary 
circumstance because the impact of Allegiant’s operations was “likely to be highly 
controversial on environmental grounds.”  FAA Order 1050.1F at ¶ 5-2(b)(10). These 
issues have been waived because they were not raised in the Petitioner’s initial brief.  
Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 
398 (3d Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for 
those purposes a passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before 
this court.”) (internal quotations omitted).  Second, the Petitioners attempt to join the 
Township’s challenge to the FAA’s analysis of the effect that Allegiant’s operation at 
Trenton would have on air quality in the area.  However, again, the Petitioners failed to 
adequately raise such argument in their initial brief, so it is waived.  Id.  Accordingly, we 
need not consider the issue.  N.J. Retail Merchs. Ass'n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 
383 n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (“‘Although an amicus brief can be helpful in elaborating issues 
properly presented by the parties, it is normally not a method for injecting new issues into 
an appeal, at least in cases where the parties are competently represented by counsel.’”) 
(quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445 (2d Cir. 2001)). 
